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In a landmark 1994 publication in the British Journal of Social Psychology, Jost and Banaji proposed
the existence of a novel, fundamental system justification motive that drives social behaviors. More
specifically, they proposed (a) that people have an epistemic need to support social hierarchies and
societal systems, (b) that this system justification motive is inversely related to personal and group
interests among members of low status groups, and (c) that it is stronger and more effective for
people who are disadvantaged by societal systems than for those who are advantaged by them,
especially when personal and group interests are weak. This system justification theory (SJT) has
faced theoretical opposition from social identity researchers (e.g., Spears et al., 2001; Reicher, 2004;
Rubin and Hewstone, 2004). In addition, evidence against the theory has recently accumulated
from large scale cross-national studies (e.g., Brandt, 2013; Kelemen et al., 2014) and experimental
studies (Trump and White, 2015; Owuamalam et al., 2016). In the present article, we re-examine
the key cognitive dissonance assumptions for SJT’s central proposition that support for unequal
systems should be higher among members of disadvantaged groups than among members of
advantaged groups when personal and group interests are weak.
WHY SHOULD MEMBERS OF DISADVANTAGED GROUPS BE
MOST LIKELY TO JUSTIFY THE SYSTEM THAT DISADVANTAGES
THEM?
At the heart of SJT is the idea that the motive to support or justify social hierarchies and
systems operates separately from personal or group interests. Jost and Banaji (1994) were
emphatic about this point, stating that: “system-justification does not...[operate] in the service
of protecting the interests of the self or the group” (p. 10). However, operationally it is
difficult (though not impossible) to distinguish personal, group, and system motives. One
useful approach has been to focus on the responses of members of disadvantaged groups
because, although SJT assumes that personal and group interests reinforce the system motive
among people who belong to advantaged groups (e.g., European Americans), the theory also
assumes that personal and group interests conflict with the system motive among people
who belong to disadvantaged groups (e.g., Black/African Americans). Hence, the system
justification that is shown by members of disadvantaged groups can be attributed entirely
to the system justification motive rather than to personal and/or group motives, which
would predict a lack of support for the system. Indeed, based on cognitive dissonance
theory (Festinger, 1962), SJT proposes that members of disadvantaged groups will be
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more likely than their privileged counterparts to experience
cognitive dissonance: That is, a conflict between the need to
improve their disadvantaged position in the social hierarchy (i.e.,
personal/group interest) and the need to support the existing
social order (the system motive). Consequently, SJT proposes
that members of disadvantaged groups will be more motivated
and more likely than members of advantaged groups to resolve
this cognitive dissonance by embracing societal systems that
disadvantage them.
WHEN SHOULD MEMBERS OF
DISADVANTAGED GROUPS BE MOST
LIKELY TO JUSTIFY THE SYSTEM?
Cognitive dissonance theory outlines a number of strategies that
people may use to resolve the tension between their attitudinal
preferences and a starkly opposing social reality. For example,
people may adjust their attitudinal preferences so that they
become compatible with reality and the status quo (i.e., social
stasis). Alternatively, they may attempt to change reality so that
it is in alignment with personal and collective preferences (i.e.,
social change). SJT assumes that people will be most likely to
resolve their cognitive dissonance and associated uncertainties in
the first way, by supporting social systems, when they feel that
the system is stable and unchangeable (cf. Jost et al., 2012). SJT
also proposes that this system justification should be most likely
when personal and group interests are weak. As Jost et al. (2004)
explained:
The strongest, most paradoxical form of the system justification
hypothesis, which draws also on the logic of cognitive dissonance
theory, is that members of disadvantaged groups would be even
more likely than members of advantaged groups to support the
status quo, at least when personal and group interests are low in
salience [emphasis added] (p. 909).
The reason for this prediction is that personal and/or group
motives may at times overwhelm and obscure the system motive
and, consequently, the effects of the systemmotive are only likely
to be apparent when personal and group motives are weak.
AN INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN
COGNITIVE DISSONANCE THEORY AND
SJT
There is an important problemwith SJT’s assumption that system
justification should be most apparent when personal and group
interests are weak. Cognitive dissonance theory predicts that
people will experience a dilemma (or cognitive conflict) only
when a belief or attitude that is important to them runs counter
to reality. As Festinger (1962) explained:
The magnitude of the dissonance, of course, will also be affected
by those variables that affect the importance of the cognitive
elements involved in the dissonance. The more important
[emphasis added] the elements, the greater will be the magnitude
of the dissonance (pp. 179–180).
Hence, only people who have strong attitudinal preferences
toward (or attachment to) their disadvantaged group identities
should experience a significant cognitive conflict with a social
reality that disadvantages their group. If people are weakly
invested in their disadvantaged group identity, then it is
unlikely that this weak attitudinal preference will be sufficient
to cause a conflict with a disadvantageous social reality, with
the implication that system justification should be less likely,
not more likely. Subsequent refinements of cognitive dissonance
theory have, if anything, only strengthened the claim that the
key elements creating dissonance must be important, central and
self-relevant. For example, Aronson (1994) stated that “...my own
research has led me to conclude that dissonance effects may be
limited to situations where our behavior violates our own self-
concept...” (p. 231). Empirical evidence by Simon et al. (1995)
also supports the moderating effect of the personal importance
of the elements that are involved in cognitive dissonance effects
(see also Smith and Mackie, 2007). Even Jost et al. (2003, p. 32)
acknowledge this inconsistency but do not provide a reason for it.
Perhaps for this reason, recent revisions of SJT have
suggested that system justification should be most likely to
emerge when people are dependent on the system for some
benefit, such as access to healthcare and education (Kay et al.,
2009) or remunerations and salaries (van der Toorn et al.,
2015). This system dependence is thought to increase the sense
of cognitive dissonance and subsequent system justification.
However, the distinction between personal/group interests and
system dependence is open to question on both theoretical and
empirical grounds. Theoretically, it is unclear why dependence
on a social system (e.g., healthcare) would not be strongly related
to (vested) personal and group interests associated with that
system. Empirically, there are some open questions about the
research that supports the distinction by contrasting system
dependence and personal/group interests.
For example, Kay et al. (2009) exposed participants to an
experimental manipulation of system dependence (see Table 1)
and then examined the effect of this manipulation on Rosenberg’s
(1965) Self-Esteem Scale (their proxy for personal-interest),
Luhtanen and Crocker’s (1992) Collective Self-Esteem Scale
(their proxy for group-interest), and a measure of system
dependency. Consistent with predictions, Kay et al. found that
their system dependence manipulation increased participants’
system dependence but did not affect their personal or collective
self-esteem. Based on this evidence, they concluded that system
dependence is independent from personal and group interests.
However, a closer look at Kay et al.’s (2009) measure of system
dependency raises some doubts about this conclusion. First,
Kay et al.’s two-item measure of system dependence appears
to measure personal and group interests. The first item states:
“The decisions and actions of the federal government affect
me personally [emphasis added]” (p. 427). The second item:
“Individual Canadians success’ [emphasis added] depends on the
government making good decisions” (p. 427) also refers to a
potential mix of personal and group interests.
In addition, the operationalization of system dependency
in Kay et al.’s (2009) study supports the view that personal
interests are part and parcel of system dependency. As can
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TABLE 1 | operationalization and manipulation of system dependency as put forward by Kay et al. (2009).
Operationalization of system dependency
Country dependency (p. 425) University dependency (p. 425)
Measurement of system dependency (two
items, p. 427):
“The decisions and actions of the federal
government affect me personally,” and
“Individual Canadians’ success depends on the
government making good decisions”
Many young people feel that the decision they make
in terms of where to live is a very important one. In
fact, recent surveys report that even at age 40,
people still consider that their choice to live where
they do was one of the most impactful decisions of
their life. Indeed, sociological studies comparing the
outcomes of residents of various countries show
that there might be some truth to these perceptions.
In particular, it seems that the country you live in has
enormously broad effects on your life and wellbeing.
In terms of financial wellbeing, for instance, the
taxes you pay, the job and investment opportunities
made available to you and the general state of the
economy are all to a large extent under the control
of your country’s government. But even in terms of
social and personal wellbeing, the country you live
in has substantial impacts: the quality of your social
services (health and education), the leisure activities
you have access to and time to pursue, even the
likelihood that you will be happy with your eventual
life-partner—all these aspects of your life are ones
that are, at least according to these studies, to
some degree dependent on the country you live in.
Many new students feel that the decision they made
to attend their particular university was a very
important one. In fact, recent surveys of university
alumni report even at age 40 that their choice of
university was one of the most impactful decisions
of their life. Indeed, sociological studies comparing
the outcomes of students and alumni of various
universities show that there might be some truth to
these perceptions. In particular, it seems that the
university you attend has enormously broad effects
on your life and wellbeing. In terms of financial
wellbeing, for instance, the fees you pay and the job
opportunities made available to you during and after
graduation are all to a large extent under the control
of your university. But even in terms of social and
personal wellbeing, the university you attend has
substantial impacts: the quality of your peers and
professors, the extracurricular activities you have
access to, the people you are likely to meet and
befriend and even eventually settle down with—all
these aspects of your life are ones that are, at least
according to these studies, to some degree
dependent on your university.
Italics in the text above represents our emphasis and were not included in the original piece.
be seen in Table 1, their operational manipulation of system
dependency refers to the country or university that participants
belonged to having: “enormously broad effects on your life
and wellbeing...[and affecting] the taxes you pay, the job
and investment opportunities made available to you...”. These
examples all appear to be rooted in personal and/or group
interests and, taking them into account, Kay et al.’s evidence
seems to suggest that making personal and group interests salient
increases people’s personal and group interests as much as their
system dependence. Thus, Kay et al.’s (2009) findings, as with van
der Toorn et al.’s (2015), seem to be consistent with emerging
evidence that system justification can go hand in hand with
personal and group interests (e.g., Owuamalam et al., 2016, in
press) rather than being in opposition to them or only coming to
the fore when these interests are weak.
In short, researchers have yet to provide convincing evidence
that system dependence is conceptually and empirically distinct
from personal/group interests (i.e., either unrelated or inversely
related). This makes it difficult to sustain the claim that
people with weak personal or group interests, but high system
dependence, will be subject to the most cognitive dissonance
and thus the greatest system justification. More direct evidence
for the precise dissonance mechanism mediating these effects is
required.
CAN PERSONAL AND GROUP INTERESTS
ACCOUNT FOR SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION?
We have discussed a key problem with SJT’s system motive
explanation for system justification amongst members of
disadvantaged groups. Modifications to SJT that remove this
motive render SJT’s position conceptually similar to other
mainstream accounts such as social identity theory (SIT: Tajfel
and Turner, 1979). But this is not necessarily a bad thing.
As Kay and Jost (2014, p. 146) acknowledged, “another,
quite different approach is to distill a common denominator
... and conclude that seemingly disparate theories are really
all saying the same thing ....” A common denominator
between SJT and its competition (e.g., SIT) could be that
personal and group interests drive system justification even
if accepting the status quo may seem costly to members of
disadvantaged groups in the short term (e.g., Owuamalam et al.,
2016).
CONCLUSION
We examined the cognitive dissonance assumption underlying
SJT (Jost and Banaji, 1994), and our analysis highlights a
theoretical inconsistency between cognitive dissonance theory
and SJT. SJT proposes that system justification should be most
apparent among members of disadvantaged groups who have
weak personal and group interests because (a) they have the
largest discrepancy between their personal/group interests and
their disadvantaged position and (b) the system motive is
least likely to be overwhelmed by weak personal and/or group
motives. In contrast, a straightforward interpretation of cognitive
dissonance theory predicts that system justification should be
strongest among members of disadvantaged groups when their
personal and group interests are strong, not weak, because
it is under these conditions that cognitive dissonance is at
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its greatest. Attempts to resolve this theoretical inconsistency
with recourse to the additional concept of system dependency
have not, in our opinion, been successful. Consequently, we
recommend a revision of SJT that brings it more in line
with the original predictions of cognitive dissonance theory.
In this revision, personal and group interests may predict
system justification amongst members of disadvantaged groups.
Of course, if the system motive is dispensed with in favor
of personal and group motives, then it is unclear what
remains in SJT’s account that makes it theoretically distinct
from other theories of intergroup relations such as SIT.
Nevertheless, SJT has provided an important platform for
contemplating why members of disadvantaged groups justify the
social system that disadvantages them. However, its cognitive
dissonance explanation of the system justification effect is
contestable. In our view, it is more parsimonious to explain
system justification in terms of personal and group motives
as emerging evidence now suggests (see Owuamalam et al.,
2016).
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